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Lights Out for Puerto Rico’s
Restructuring Law?
PUERTO RICO’S MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY
DILEMMA1
INTRODUCTION
Detroit’s record-breaking municipal bankruptcy has
captured the attention of American media recently, while the
potentially more catastrophic bankruptcy looming in Puerto Rico
has been underreported.2 Even in the Caribbean, the focus of
news reports has been on the potential normalization of U.S.-
Cuba relations and not on the storm brewing in Puerto Rico.3
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s official debt estimate is
approximately $73.5 billion, not including an additional $38
billion in unfunded healthcare and pension liabilities.4 Much of
this debt is on the verge of default and, if mishandled, could
have a significant negative effect on the world economy just as it
is recovering from the global financial crisis.5
1 On the eve of the publication of this note, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit decided Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, Case Nos. 15-
1218, 15-1221, 15-1271, 15-1272, slip. op. (1st Cir. July 6, 2015), holding that the Puerto
Rico Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act is unconstitutional. I believe that the First
Circuit came to the correct conclusion, for reasons that will be discussed later in the note
in the context of a discussion of the district court’s decision. As of the date of publication,
Puerto Rico is still considering an appeal to the Supreme Court. Alan Crosby & Megan
Davies, Puerto Rico's Governor Considering Appeal Over Recovery Act Decision,
REUTERS (July 7, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/07/usa-puertorico-appeal-
idUSL1N0ZN2D920150707.
2 Editorial, Congress Can Help Ease Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis, WASH. POST
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-can-ease-puerto-ricos-
debt-crisis/2015/02/26/535f2aee-b877-11e4-a200-c008a01a6692_story.html.
3 William M. LeoGrande, 5 Things Cuba Can Do to Speed the
Normalization of Relations with the United States, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-m-leogrande/five-things-cuba-can-do-t_b_
6809824.html.
4 Richard Finger, Puerto Rico: Paradise Lost, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-finger/puerto-rico-pardise-lost_b_6769950.html.
5 Belen Marty, Surprise! Puerto Rico’s Public Debt Is Far Larger Than
Stated, PANAM POST (July 16, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://panampost.com/belen-marty/
2014/07/16/surprise-puerto-ricos-public-debt-is-far-larger-than-stated/.
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The Commonwealth’s government-owned public utilities,
particularly the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA),
are unable to pay their staggering debts and are nearing a fiscal
catastrophe.6 The situation is exacerbated by the tenuous legality
of a Puerto Rican municipal bankruptcy, a safety valve afforded to
states but withheld from Puerto Rico under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.7 Investors fear that a Puerto Rican debt crisis could
negatively impact the global economy similar to the effect of the
Greek debt crisis that began several years ago and continues to
destabilize the global economy.8 At that time, people feared that if
Greece defaulted it would destroy “people’s faith in the ability of
other countries to pay their debts . . . creating a domino effect that
could cripple global markets.”9
PREPA is one of the main culprits behind Puerto Rico’s
burgeoning debt. PREPA is the largest municipal power system
in the U.S., in terms of customers (1.47 million) and revenues
($4.4 billion), and is the sole electric utility on the island.10
PREPA comprises nearly $9 billion, or 12%, of Puerto Rico’s
debt.11 PREPA has been able to amass such a massive amount of
debt because Puerto Rico’s debt is widely held as a result “of its
generous tax benefits, with almost two-thirds of [American]
municipal-bond funds holding the commonwealth’s debt.”12 This
only heightens fears about the magnitude of damage that a
PREPA default could cause.13
PREPA is currently on the verge of insolvency, and due to
U.S. bankruptcy law, is unable to file for bankruptcy.14 To rectify
6 Tom Tzitzouris, Why Would a Puerto Rico Debt Crisis Matter?, FORBES
(Oct. 16, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/16/why-would-a-
puerto-rico-debt-crisis-matter/.
7 Editorial, supra note 2.
8 Natalie Kitroeff & Joe Weisenthall,Why You Should Care About Greece Again,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2015-01-
02/why-you-should-care-about-greece-again.
9 Id.
10 FITCH RATINGS, FITCH RATES PUERTO RICO POWER AUTH’S $453.8M POWER
REV BNDS ‘BBB+’; OUTLK TO NEGATIVE (Mar. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.aeepr.com/investors/docs/financial%20information/rating%20report/fitch%2
7s%20media%20release%20-%20march%202012.pdf.
11 Puerto Rico to Pay $9.7 mn to Restructuring Consultant, FOX NEWS LATINO
(Sept. 16, 2014), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/09/16/puerto-rico-to-pay-7-
mn-to-restructuring-consultant/.
12 Aaron Kuriloff, Puerto Rico Moves to Restructure Debt, WALL ST. J. (June
26, 2014, 11:54 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-governor-proposes-law-
to-restructure-public-entities-1403724012?mg=id-wsj.
13 Id.
14 COMMONWEALTH OF P.R., GOV’T DEVELOPMENT BANK FOR PUERTO RICO, THE
FACTS ABOUTPUERTORICO’SPUBLICCORPORATIONSDEBTENFORCEMENT ANDRECOVERYACT
(2014), http://www.gdb-pur.com/documents/FactsAboutDebtEnforcementAndRecoveryAct.pdf.
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the situation, Puerto Rico recently passed the Puerto Rico Public
Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act),
which would allow PREPA and other Puerto Rican municipal
entities to enter bankruptcy and modify or discharge their debts.15
PREPA bondholders fear that the passage of the Recovery
Act is a prelude to a municipal bankruptcy that will greatly dilute
the value of their investments.16 Several PREPA investors have
banded together to challenge the constitutionality of the Recovery
Act, alleging that Congress expressly excluded Puerto Rico from
the municipal bankruptcy laws and that the Recovery Act’s
attempt to extend bankruptcy law is unconstitutional.17 Recently,
in Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico (Franklin),
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
ruled that the Recovery Act was unconstitutional.18 Specifically,
the court held that it was preempted by the Federal Bankruptcy
Code. However, the ruling failed to address whether there was an
unconstitutional taking or if the Recovery Act violated the
contracts clause.19 Puerto Rico has already filed for an appeal in
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston, asking for an
expedited decision and claiming that the Recovery Act was an
“emergency response to the most profound fiscal crisis in [the]
Commonwealth[’s] history.”20
This note argues that the District of Puerto Rico made the
correct decision in deeming the Recovery Act unconstitutional, and
that the Puerto Rican Legislature did not have the legislative
authority to fill the municipal bankruptcy “gap” left by
Congress.21 Part I of this note will introduce the Recovery Act, as
well as the economic problems that led to its passage. Part II
will discuss the potential negative economic effects that a
PREPA bankruptcy could have on global, American, and Puerto
Rican financial markets. A PREPA bankruptcy has the potential
to shock the global economy into a recession and could have
lasting negative effects on Puerto Rico, ranging from a
humanitarian crisis to a lasting reputation for default, impairing
15 Id.
16 Andrew Scurria, Bankruptcy Cases to Watch in 2015, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2015,
3:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/604190/bankruptcy-cases-to-watch-in-2015.
17 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, No. 14-1518 (FAB), slip op. at
1, 7 (D.P.R. Feb. 6, 2015).
18 As mentioned earlier, the First Circuit has affirmed the ruling, and Puerto
is still considering whether to appeal to the Supreme Court. See supra note1.
19 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, slip op. at 75.
20 Update 1-Puerto Rico Asks for Quick Decision in Bankruptcy Ruling Appeal,
REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2015, 12:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/20/usa-
puertorico-bankruptcy-idUSL1N0VU1MA20150220.
21 COMMONWEALTH OF P.R., supra note 14.
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the Commonwealth’s ability to raise money in the future. Part
III will explore the constitutional arguments against the
adoption of the Recovery Act in the context of Puerto Rico’s
unique status as a U.S. Commonwealth. The constitutional
deficiencies in the Recovery Act are numerous; the Recovery Act
has been preempted by federal bankruptcy law, it attempts to
impose an impermissible stay of federal litigation, and it violates
both the Takings and Contract Clauses of the Constitution. Part
IV will propose alternatives to the unconstitutional Recovery
Act. Any realistic solution to PREPA’s problems will likely need
to begin with Puerto Rico’s willing repeal of the Recovery Act.
From there, a number of options are left to the Commonwealth;
PREPA could try and revise operations to turn around the
company or attempt to secure a workout with creditors. Puerto
Rico’s journey will not be an easy one, but the Recovery Act is
not the answer to the island’s problems.
I. BACKGROUND ON PREPA AND THE RECOVERY ACT
Puerto Rico (the Commonwealth) has been having
economic troubles for years.22 As an American Commonwealth,
Puerto Rico is subject to U.S. federal minimum wage laws and
uses the American dollar as its currency.23 These factors make it
difficult for Puerto Rico to export goods internationally and
effectively compete in the global market.24 From 1976 until 2006,
the Commonwealth was exempt from federal taxes on local
profits—an exemption that helped the country stay afloat.25 But
once that exemption expired in 2006, it contributed to the
Commonwealth’s steady and continuing recession.26 Moreover,
Puerto Rico’s available workforce has been rapidly dissipating.
“From April 2010 through July 2014 Puerto Rico’s population
declined by over 177 thousand people and by the end of 2015 is
expected to reach 3.45 million, the lowest in a century.”27 Even
with this continuing exodus decreasing the number of eligible
workers, the Commonwealth’s unemployment still sits at over
22 Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis: Neither a State nor Independent, ECONOMIST
(July 5, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21606319-how-territory-
falls-between-bankruptcy-regimes-neither-state-nor-independent.
23 Puerto Rico Basic Facts, COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, GOV’T
DEVELOPMENT BANK FOR PUERTO RICO, http://www.gdb-pur.com/economy/puerto-rico-
facts.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2015); Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#PuertoRico.
24 Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis: Neither a State nor Independent, supra note 22.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Finger, supra note 4.
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14%.28 All of these factors contribute to the Commonwealth’s
economic downturn, which in turn has taken a toll on its
municipal corporations.29
A. PREPA’s Slide Towards Insolvency
Puerto Rico’s economic struggles have negatively impacted
investors’ views of the island’s debt as a viable investment
opportunity.30 Concurrently, credit rating agencies have
continuously lowered Puerto Rico and its municipal corporations’
credit ratings, making it harder for the Commonwealth to secure
financing.31 To date, PREPA’s bonds are rated as “junk”, indicating
that they are close to defaulting.32 PREPA’s bonds are rated as
Caa3 by Moody’s,33 CCC34 by Standard & Poor’s, and CC35 by
Fitch.36 In 2012, the bonds held a BBB+ rating from Fitch,
showing just how quickly the economic situation has
deteriorated.37 After Detroit’s bankruptcy, investors became wary
28 John Burnett, Island of Disenchantment, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 11, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/03/11/puerto-ricos-agencies-
dont-need-chapter-9-bankruptcy.
29 Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis: Neither a State nor Independent, supra note 22.
30 Danielle Kurtzleben, Puerto Rico’s Population Continues Rapid Decline,
U.S. NEWS (Jan. 2, 2014, 5:48 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/
01/02/puerto-ricos-population-continues-rapid-decline.
31 See id.
32 PREPA Credit Ratings, GOV’T DEVELOPMENT BANK FOR PUERTO RICO,
http://www.gdb-pur.com/investors_resources/prepa.html (last visited May 4, 2015).
33 Bonds with a Moody’s Rating of Caa “are judged to be speculative of poor
standing and are subject to very high credit risk”; the “3” modifier indicates that it is the
lowest possible rating within this class. A Caa rating is two steps above a C rating, which
typically indicates default. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVS., RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS
(Mar. 2015), available at https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?
docid=PBC_79004.
34 A Standard & Poor’s Rating of “CCC” means that the credit rating is
“[c]urrently vulnerable and dependent on favorable business, financial and economic
conditions to meet financial commitments.” This is the best rating that the PREPA
bonds received from the three main ratings agencies, but it is still only three levels
above default and is not a positive indicator of future health. Credit Ratings Definitions
& FAQs, STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-
and-faqs/en/us (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
35 A Fitch Rating of “CC” Denotes that a “[d]efault of some kind appears
probable.” It is only two steps above default. Fitch Ratings Definitions, FITCH RATINGS,
https://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/public/ratings_defintions/index.cfm?rd_file=ltr
#LTR (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
36 PREPA Credit Ratings, supra note 32.
37 A Fitch rating of BBB+ signifies that the investment is of investment grade
quality (much higher than junk bond status), and it “indicates[s] that expectations of
default risk are currently low. The capacity for payment of financial commitments is
considered adequate but adverse business or economic conditions are more likely to
impair this capacity.” Fitch Ratings Definitions, supra note 35.
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of municipal defaults, further impacting PREPA’s ability to sell
bonds to raise capital.38
For a number of reasons, PREPA, the sole electricity
provider in Puerto Rico, has been operating at a loss since 2011.39
From 2011 through 2013, PREPA’s net financial position
decreased by $272.4 million, $346.2 million, and $275.7 million
per year, respectively.40 This accounts for a total of nearly $900
million in losses over the span of just three years.41 One of the
reasons for PREPA’s chronic underperformance is its reliance on
outdated and uneconomical methods of producing electricity.42
PREPA still uses fuel oil to generate nearly 65% of its power, an
operating process which has largely been left behind in other
countries.43 This technique is not only inefficient, but expensive as
well. It costs PREPA nearly twice as much to produce energy as
compared to other U.S. energy companies.44 PREPA has only been
able to continue making these oil purchases by taking on new
debt.45 Although the recent drop in oil prices has helped PREPA
lower its costs in the short term, the lower price does not obviate
PREPA’s need for structural changes.46 PREPA not only faces
internal structural challenges, but faces pressure from the Puerto
Rican government, which forces PREPA to grant subsidies to
other government utilities—by 2017, the cost of these subsidies
could account for over 17% of PREPA’s income.47 Fear for the
future of the utility is justified and was one of the catalysts for the
passage of the Recovery Act.48
38 Nick Reeve, Detroit’s Bankruptcy and its Impact on Your Bond Portfolio, CHIEF
INVESTMENT OFFICER (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.ai-cio.com/channel/risk_management/
detroit_s_bankruptcy_and_its_impact_on_your_bond_portfolio.html.
39 PUERTO RICO POWER AUTH., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, REQUIRED





42 Daniel Gross, Why is Puerto Rico Burning Oil to Generate Electricity?, SLATE





46 Daniel Irvin, Low Oil Prices Could Accelerate Puerto Rico’s Recovery,
SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 9, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2809835-low-
oil-prices-could-accelerate-puerto-ricos-recovery.
47 Suneet Chandvani & Simone Baribeau, Puerto Rico’s Utility Siblings Prep
for Subsidy Fight, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2014, 3:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/debtwire/2014/10/28/puerto-ricos-utility-siblings-prep-for-subsidy-fight/.
48 THE FACTS ABOUT PUERTO RICO’S PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DEBT
ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT, supra note 14.
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B. History of the Municipal Bankruptcy and its Application
to PREPA
Municipal bankruptcies were first deemed constitutional
by the Supreme Court in 1938, and since then, less than 700 cases
have been filed.49 Many of the filed cases were not actually filed by
municipalities, but rather by special subsets of the municipalities,
such as public utility corporations.50 Municipalities and their
subsets are banned from filing bankruptcies under all chapters of
the Bankruptcy Code except for Chapter 9, which is specific to
municipal bankruptcies.51 A Chapter 9 bankruptcy has unique
rules that differentiate it from the processes and procedures that
are followed under the other bankruptcy chapters, providing
special protections to the municipalities.52 Many of these
protections are concerned with upholding federalism principles
and protecting the states’ sovereignty from outside influences.53
Before filing for a Chapter 9 bankruptcy, the filing municipality
must first ask the state for permission and cannot file without
state approval.54 In the United States, 23 states have specified
that they have not authorized their municipalities to file, leaving
them unable to seek a municipal bankruptcy, and two states have
expressly forbidden their municipalities from filing a Chapter 9
bankruptcy petition.55
Municipal bankruptcies were first implemented during the
Great Depression and were created by an amendment to the
Federal Bankruptcy Code.56 However, soon after their introduction,
the Supreme Court struck down the new municipal bankruptcy
laws over concerns that Congress was abrogating the states’
sovereignty.57 In 1937, Congress again tried to amend the
bankruptcy laws to allow for municipal bankruptcies, and this
49 Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 406 (2014) (providing background on the history of the
municipal bankruptcy).
50 Id.
51 Seena Foster, Eligibility for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Relief, Applicable to
Municipalities, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 57 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 121, 133 (2011).
52 Hannah Heck, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations of the
Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89, 97 (2011).
53 Id.
54 Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 870 Before
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3-4 (2015) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 870] (testimony of
Thomas Mayer, Partner, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP).
55 Id.
56 Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934).
57 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S.
513, 532 (1936).
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time they were more careful concerning limitations placed on the
states.58 In particular, there was a concern that state functions
would be put into the hands of the bankruptcy court or creditors.59
State sovereignty is one of the central concerns in municipal
bankruptcies. In fact, the preface to Chapter 9 explicitly states
that the chapter “does not limit or impair the power of a State to
control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such
State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of
such municipality, including expenditures for such exercise.”60
These limitations affect what a municipal bankruptcy can
accomplish—the municipality cannot just liquidate and walk
away as a corporation can.61 Similarly, there are limitations on
the effects that bankruptcy can have on other entities, such as the
municipality’s constituents.62 “Chapter 9 was never intended to
serve as a comprehensive scheme to solve municipal financial
problems; it was designed to complement state efforts to solve
those problems.”63 Furthermore, municipal bankruptcies raise a
host of difficult questions; for example, in the Detroit bankruptcy
there was concern over how much recovery would go to the
bondholders based on their legal contracts and how much would go
to the municipal workers’ pension plans.64 Municipal bankruptcies
are much more circumscribed than other bankruptcies, and in
many cases the protections are necessary, but these limitations
can also create more problems than they solve.
C. PREPA and its Potential Municipal Bankruptcy
An understanding of the history of Chapter 9 municipal
bankruptcy is essential to understanding how Puerto Rico’s unique
situation interacts with the purposes and intentions of Chapter 9.
The tensions of federalism have played an important role in the
creation and application of Chapter 9 bankruptcy law, and Puerto
Rico occupies a unique niche in this area. Additionally, many of the
processes surrounding Chapter 9 remain unsettled due to a
58 Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937).
59 Id.
60 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
61 Cory Eucalitto et al., Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview for Local Officials,
STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/
publications/detail/municipal-bankruptcy-an-overview-for-local-officials.
62 Id.
63 Moringiello, supra note 49, at 485.
64 Danielle Kurtzleben, Detroit Bankruptcy Could Affect City Workers
Nationwide, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 3, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2013/12/03/detroit-bankruptcy-could-affect-city-workers-nationwide.
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relative lack of case law.65 Puerto Rico’s status as a commonwealth
makes it even harder to draw on this limited pool of precedent.
Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status both grants it unique
advantages and creates certain obstacles.66 In 1900, the Foraker
Act established Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory and
introduced the position of the Puerto Rican non-voting delegate to
Congress.67 In 1952, Puerto Rico became a commonwealth, a status
which it continues to hold today.68 Legally, while Puerto Rican
citizens are U.S. citizens, Puerto Rico is subject to U.S. federal laws
that do not always provide the same benefits to Puerto Ricans as
they do to state citizens.69 Today, Puerto Rico still has one non-
voting representative in Congress, Representative Pedro Pierluisi.70
Under the current construction of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code, PREPA has no bankruptcy outlet.71 As a municipal
corporation, PREPA is excluded from either liquidating under
Chapter 7, or filing for reorganization under Chapter 11.72
Additionally, Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy code explicitly
excludes Puerto Rican municipal entities from being able to file
for municipal bankruptcy.73 Per the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he term
‘State’ includes . . . Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining
who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”74
In response to PREPA’s economic degradation, Puerto
Rico passed the Recovery Act, which would allow Puerto Rican
municipal entities to enter bankruptcy.75 According to the Puerto
Rican government, one of the main reasons for the implementation
of the Act was “to fill the gap in restructuring law and ensure that
no critical services are jeopardized.”76 The Commonwealth
65 Rachel E. Schwartz, This Way To The Egress: Should Bridgeport’s Chapter
9 Filing Have Been Dismissed?, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 104 (1992).
66 See generally Lani E. Medina, An Unsatisfactory Case of Self-
Determination: Resolving Puerto Rico’s Political Status, 33 FORD. INT’L L.J. 1048 (2010)
(an article exploring Puerto Rico’s history in relation to the United States, the current
status of the Commonwealth, and how this confusing and unresolved situation can be
resolved with finality).
67 The Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56–191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
68 Medina, supra note 66, at 1048-49.
69 Id. at 1049-50.
70 Kyle Glazier, Pierluisi Offers Bill to Include Puerto Rico under Muni
Bankruptcy Law, BOND BUYER (July 31, 2014, 4:08 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/
news/washington-budget-finance/pierluisi-offers-bill-to-include-puerto-rico-under-
muni-bankruptcy-law-1064876-1.html.
71 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2014).
72 Moringiello, supra note 49, at 406 n.7.
73 11 U.S.C. § 101(52).
74 Id.
75 THE FACTS ABOUT PUERTO RICO’S PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DEBT
ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT, supra note 14.
76 Id.
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recognizes that the federal government left Puerto Rico out of the
municipal bankruptcy equation, stating that Puerto Rican
municipalities “fall into an unintended gap in the legal system.”77
The Commonwealth expressly excluded itself from being
able to utilize the Recovery Act and limited the Recovery Act’s
applicability to a few select municipal corporations, including
PREPA.78 Many speculate that the Recovery Act was actually
drafted solely for use by PREPA.79 The Recovery Act presumes
to allow municipal bankruptcies under either Chapter 2 or
Chapter 3, both of which present different ways for the public
corporations to restructure their debts.80
Under a Chapter 2 proceeding, the municipal corporation is
seeking consensual debt relief with its creditors.81 The statute
presupposes that debtors will attempt to utilize this route before
commencing a nonconsensual Chapter 3 proceeding; however, the
statute does not put any restrictions in place to assure this result.82
Fundamentally, in a Chapter 2 proceeding, the municipal debtor
agrees to make structural and operating changes in return for
refinancing its debts with creditors, similar to a workout.83 “A
workout is a negotiated process by which a financially troubled
debtor and its creditors agree to modify certain terms of the claims
against the debtor in order to permit it to stay in business.”84
Chapter 2 cases may only be initiated by the municipal
corporation, and once commenced by the filing of a notice, an
automatic stay comes into effect for at least 270 days.85 The
automatic stay is a principal feature of U.S. bankruptcy law.86
The stay prohibits creditors from attempting to hunt down and
levy on the debtor’s assets and allows for a systematic and orderly
distribution or reorganization of the debtor’s estate.87 Generally,
under U.S. bankruptcy law, the automatic stay protects the
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Kevin Mead, Financial Restructuring in Duties of PREPA’s New CRO Post,
CARIBBEAN BUS. (Aug. 19, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://caribbeanbusinesspr.com/news/
financial-restructuring-part-of-duties-of-prepas-new-cro-post-99796.html.
80 THE FACTS ABOUT PUERTO RICO’S PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DEBT
ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT, supra note 14.
81 The Puerto Rico Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, Act 71-
2014 (2014). English translation available at http://www.lexjuris.com/lexlex/Leyes2014/
lexl2014071d.htm [hereinafter The Recovery Act].
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy and
Securities Regulation in the Workout Context, 46 RUTGERSL.REV. 1211, 1220 (1994).
85 The Recovery Act, supra note 81.
86 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
87 Id.
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debtor for the duration of the bankruptcy case.88 But this is not
the case under the Recovery Act, which gives the debtor
protection for the first 270 days of the case, but requires 20% of a
creditor class to approve 90-day extensions beyond that.89 For a
final municipal restructuring plan to be approved, creditors
holding at least 50% of the debt need to vote on the plan, and of
that amount, holders of at least 75% of the total debt value need
to approve the transaction.90 However, as with U.S. bankruptcy
cases, once the plan has been approved, it is binding on all
creditors.91 The Recovery Act characterizes this path as “designed
to be efficient and expedient in light of the consensual nature of
the transaction.”92
Alternatively, a public corporation may choose to follow
the more structured and court-intensive Chapter 3 path, which
requires the approval of the Government Development Bank
(GDB) for a proceeding to commence.93 The law places several
constraints on who can utilize this path, in addition to the general
requirements mentioned above. The municipal corporation needs
to be insolvent, and it needs to fall within the “gap” that Puerto
Rico aims to fill with the passage of the Recovery Act.94 To fit in
this “gap,” the corporation must be ineligible to file under the
Federal Bankruptcy Code, because it is ineligible for a Chapter 7
or Chapter 11 bankruptcy and is not a “municipality” for the
purposes of filing for Chapter 9.95 Beyond this, Chapter 3 resembles
Chapter 11 of the current U.S. Bankruptcy Code, in that it allows a
restructuring of debt which the court can force on creditors.96
While both of the Recovery Act’s chapters draw on
current U.S. bankruptcy law, there are some key differences
that could cause problems. First, by creating a new municipal
bankruptcy law, Puerto Rico has rendered it harder to draw on
the already limited pool of municipal bankruptcy precedent.97
88 Id.




93 Id.; The GDB serves “as bank, fiscal agent and financial advisor for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and its instrumentalities.” And its mission is “[t]o
safeguard the fiscal stability of Puerto Rico and promote its competitiveness in order to
transform our economy into one of the most developed economies in the world, hence,
fostering the social and economic enhancement” of Puerto Rico. Mission, GOV’T DEV.
BANK FOR PUERTO RICO, http://www.gdb-pur.com/about-gdb/mission.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2015).
94 The Recovery Act, supra note 81.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Moringiello, supra note 49, at 406.
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This will only make it more difficult for a court to wade through
the convoluted rules of a municipal bankruptcy. More troubling
still are the changes made to the automatic stay. The automatic
stay and its ability to prevent a mad dash to consume the
debtor’s assets at the expense of other creditors is one of the core
values of the bankruptcy system.98 The changes made to the
automatic stay in Chapter 2 of the Recovery Act contravenes one
of the essential purposes of bankruptcy laws by limiting the
duration of the stay and subsequently putting its renewal in the
hands of creditors.
II. EFFECTS OF ALLOWING THE RECOVERY ACT TO STAND
The passage of the Recovery Act has already had economic
effects that will only worsen as the situation continues to unfold.
Investors have been spooked by the Act’s passage, making it
harder for Puerto Rico to borrow the money that it needs to
survive. If this continues to worsen, it could lead to a default,
leaving investors with billions of dollars of near-worthless debt.99
Legally, the Recovery Act sets a dangerous precedent in
bankruptcy and constitutional law. If PREPA’s situation worsens
and it is forced to default or to utilize the Recovery Act, there
could be unintended humanitarian effects as well.
Allowing the Recovery Act to stand would exacerbate the
negative economic effects that followed its passage.100 PREPA’s
bond ratings dropped precipitously following the Recovery Act’s
passage.101 PREPA and Puerto Rico’s ability to raise capital by
selling bonds was limited to begin with, but the ratings drop has
lowered investor confidence, making it even harder for them to
98
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors
would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor’s property. Those
who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the
detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally. A race of
diligence by creditors for the debtor’s assets prevents that.
S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 49 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5835.
99 Finger, supra note 4; Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Facing Debt Risk
Beyond Power Utility: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2015, 8:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-14/puerto-rico-facing-debt-risk-beyond-power-
utility-muni-credit.html.
100 Marty, supra note 5.
101 PREPA Credit Ratings, supra note 32.
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borrow.102 When Moody’s downgraded Puerto Rico’s credit rating,
Puerto Rico’s Governor Padilla said, “[t]hat credit agency, and
any other entity acting alike, will have to answer for this
offense,” and threatened a lawsuit.103 Recently, while the rest of
the municipal bond market has had a bit of a rally, Puerto Rico
and PREPA’s bonds have continued to backslide, signifying
decreased consumer confidence in the Commonwealth’s bonds.104
News agencies are reporting that “[t]he market action suggests
that sophisticated investors are beginning to realize that Puerto
Rico’s economic and fiscal situation is unlikely to turn around
anytime soon,” and that “[g]iven the current morass, it is hard to
recall the happy decades during which Puerto Rico was the belle
of the municipal bond market.”105
This ratings drop not only hurts the value of the current
Puerto Rican bonds in the market, but also affects Puerto
Rico’s ability to successfully raise capital in the future. This is
a problem not only for PREPA, which needs to continue to
incur debt to continue producing power, but also for the island as
a whole, which needs to raise capital from bonds to maintain a
stable economy.106 Since passing the Recovery Act, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has only raised money on the
market once, selling approximately $1.2 billion of short-term
notes to large banks in October 2014 at a high yield.107 The notes
contained an uncommon covenant that required the purchasing
banks to agree not to resell the debt.108 Investors speculate that
“[t]he commonwealth . . . may have wanted to keep the bonds
from trading immediately to avoid the risk that falling prices
might undermine investor confidence.”109 The note covenants
show that the market recognizes the uncertainty that the
Recovery Act represents, and this fear manifests itself in Puerto
102 Arturo C. Porzecanski, Puerto Rico Needs a Financial Control Board, HILL
(Oct. 24, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/221593-
puerto-rico-needs-a-financial-control-board.
103 Simone Baribeau, Puerto Rico’s Public Relations Headache, FORBES (July
28, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2014/07/28/puerto-
ricos-public-relations-headache/.
104 Porzecanski, supra note 102.
105 Id.
106 Kaske, supra note 99.
107 Matt Wirz & Aaron Kuriloff, Puerto Rico to Sell $1.2 Billion in Notes on
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Rico paying additional interest and imposing special restrictions
for the ability to raise capital.110
Further, the Recovery Act not only has economic effects,
but changes how the world perceives Puerto Rico as a sovereign
entity, impacting the Commonwealth’s “dignity.”111 “Cities,
states, and countries are considered to be sovereign in some
respects, and bankruptcy seems un-seemly—an assault on the
dignity of a sovereign.”112 A recent example of the effect this can
have on a sovereign entity is Argentina, which unilaterally
decided to restructure its debts without investor consent. Due
to this, the government “risks leaving deep structural problems
for any subsequent administration, not only in the Argentine
economy but in the legal and financial relationship with the
developed world, all of which may take years to repair.”113
Puerto Rico’s Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla “proposed the
new rules and the legislature passed them in a single day,”
without comments or hearings, leading many to believe that it
was “a statement of unwillingness to stand by the legal
commitments of the commonwealth.”114 Puerto Rico risks
further endangering its economic relationships and potentially
burning bridges that the Commonwealth will need in the
future if it is unable to balance its finances.
PREPA is the sole provider of power for the
Commonwealth, and if forced to restructure, it would likely need to
shut off power to customers, presenting a humanitarian issue.115
PREPA’s economic troubles have become so severe that they are
considering cutting a subsidy to the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority (PRASA), which provides water services for the
island.116 The discount currently stands at approximately $40
million a year, and if removed could push the already financially
110 Id.
111 Nick Brown et al., Puerto Rico Debt Crisis Headed for U.S.-Style
Bankruptcy Resolution, REUTERS (July 23, 2014, 2:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/07/23/us-puertorico-debt-analysis-idUSKBN0FS0A420140723.
112 David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People,
Places or Things)?, 55 WM. &MARY L. REV. 2217, 2226 (2014).
113 Hans Humes, Who to Blame for Argentina’s Disastrous Default? Its
Lawyers, of Course, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/aug/20/argentina-debt-default-lawyers-court-pay-clause.
114 Reid Wilson, Looming Puerto Rico Debt Deadlines Have Investors Nervous,
WASH. POST (July 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/07/
24/looming-puerto-rico-debt-deadlines-have-investors-nervous/; see also Brown et al.,
supra note 111.
115 Luciana Lopez, Puerto Rico Keeps the Lights On, But Debt Crisis Far From
Over, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2014, 6:07 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/15/us-
usa-puertorico-utility-insight-idUSKBN0GF0C320140815.
116 Chandvani & Baribeau, supra note 47.
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troubled water authority further along its own path towards
insolvency.117 If either of these utilities were forced to cease
operations, it could present a situation similar to when Detroit
shut off water to constituents as part of its own municipal
bankruptcy.118 The Detroit water shutoff was decried worldwide as
a humanitarian crisis, with the U.N. stating that “[d]isconnection
of water services because of failure to pay due to lack of means
constitutes a violation of the human right to water and other
international human rights.”119 Not only did this affect the
reputation of Detroit as a sovereign entity, but it had effects on
the city’s people as well.120 Puerto Rico potentially faces both of
these negative effects.
A PREPA bankruptcy could also shock global financial
markets. The Puerto Rico debt situation has been compared to the
Greek debt crisis, which rocked the world economy and triggered
a global recession.121 Upon closer inspection, the two situations
closely mirror one another. Both countries were downgraded to
junk bond status and afflicted with heavy debts and a lack of
economic growth.122 “Like Greece, Puerto Rico is a chronically
uncompetitive place locked in a currency union with a richer,
more productive neighbor,” in this case the United States.123 “And,
as with Greece, there are fears that a chaotic default could
precipitate a far bigger crisis by driving away investors, and
pushing up borrowing costs in America’s near-$4-trillion market
for state and local bonds.”124 Aside from the financial impact that
Greece’s financial crisis had, it also impacted citizens on a
personal level, leaving vast swathes of the population unemployed
and unable to heat their homes.125 Puerto Rico and PREPA are in
117 Id.
118 Laura Gottesdiener, UN Officials ‘Shocked’ by Detroit’s Mass Water Shutoffs,
AL JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 20, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/
2014/10/20/detroit-water-un.html.
119 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 See Michelle Miller, Detroit Water Shut-Offs Bring U.N. Scrutiny, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:05 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/detroit-water-shut-offs-
brings-u-n-scrutiny/.
121 Timothy Alexander Guzman, Puerto Rico’s Debt Bomb. Could Puerto Rico
become “The New Greece” in the Caribbean?, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/puerto-ricos-debt-bomb-could-puerto-rico-become-the-
new-greece-in-the-caribbean/5366756.




125 See Derek Gatopoulos, Suicides in Greece Spike During Financial Crisis,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/
greece-suicides_n_3900906.html; see also Maria Paravantes, A Greek Christmas Carol,
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a precarious position, burdened by structural deficiencies and
facing wide ranging consequences if they default on their debt or
enter bankruptcy.
III. CONSTITUTIONALARGUMENTSAGAINST THERECOVERYACT
As dire as Puerto Rico’s situation may seem, the
Recovery Act was not the correct response. It has been met with
fervent opposition, in large part because so many entities have
invested massive sums of money in the Commonwealth.126
PREPA bondholders worry that the passage of the Recovery Act
is a prelude to the Commonwealth restructuring its debts at
heavy losses to investors.127 In response, several bondholders
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Recovery Act
in Franklin, although this decision is currently in the midst of
an appeal.128 The District Court ruled in Franklin that the
Recovery Act was federally preempted, but in doing so did not
reach several arguments, which will be addressed below.129
There are a number of issues with the Recovery Act,
including issues of federal preemption due to Congress’s heavy
legislation in the area, issues with the automatic stay, impairment
of contracts under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, and
unconstitutional takings claims under the Fifth Amendment.
These arguments will be addressed in turn to expand upon why the
First Circuit Court of Appeals should affirm the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s ruling that the
Recovery Act is unconstitutional.
A. The Recovery Act is Federally Preempted
The Recovery Act is federally preempted by the abundance
of federal bankruptcy legislation and Congress’ purposeful
exclusion of Puerto Rico from Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
HUFFINGTON POST, (Feb. 24, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maria-
paravantes/a-greek-christmas-carol_b_4501117.html.
126 See Hunter, Legal Fault Lines Over Puerto Rico Restructuring Law Come
Into Focus, DISTRESSED DEBT INVESTING (July 29, 2014), http://www.distressed-debt-
investing.com/2014/07/legal-fault-lines-over-puerto-rico.html.
127 Aaron Kuriloff, U.S. Investment Firms Challenge Puerto Rico Restructuring
Law, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2014, 7:09 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-investment-
firms-challenge-puerto-rico-restructuring-law-1404068742.
128 Update 1-Puerto Rico Asks for Quick Decision in Bankruptcy Ruling
Appeal, supra note 20.
129 As mentioned earlier, the First Circuit has affirmed the ruling, and Puerto
Rico is still considering whether to appeal to the Supreme Court. See supra note1.
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Code.130 In Franklin, the District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico held that “[b]ecause the Recovery Act is preempted by the
federal Bankruptcy Code, it is void pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution” and thus is
unconstitutional.131 The court found express preemption, stating
that although proving federal preemption has a “high bar, this is
not a close case.” However, the court did not address arguments
about other types of preemption.132
“Federal preemption of state law can occur in three
circumstances: (1) express preemption where Congress explicitly
preempts state law; (2) implied preemption where Congress has
occupied the entire field (field preemption); and (3) implied
preemption where there is an actual conflict between federal and
state law (conflict preemption).”133 The U.S. Constitution provides
that “[t]he Congress shall have Power To . . . establish . . . uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”134 “Congress has broad authority to preempt state laws,
but whether Congress has done so in a particular instance is a
matter of congressional intent.”135 Preemption can be found not
only when a statute expressly preempts conflicting statutes, but
also when the circumstances evince intent by Congress to wholly
occupy a field and to bar the states from legislating in it.136
The Bankruptcy Code’s exclusion of Puerto Rico from
Chapter 9 is an express preemption and was drafted intentionally
by Congress to exclude Puerto Rico from pursuing a municipal
bankruptcy. Because of this, there is no inadvertent “gap” as
asserted by Puerto Rico.137 The Commonwealth would have a
much stronger argument if the Bankruptcy Code did not explicitly
list Puerto Rico as one of only two entities that are not eligible for
Chapter 9 bankruptcies.138 While drafting the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress consciously chose to limit the applicability of Chapter 9
130 As shown by the terms of 11 U.S.C. 101(52), which states “[t]he term
‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of
defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title [11 USCS §§ 901 et seq.].”
131 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, No. 14-1518 (FAB), slip op. at
1, 2 (D.P.R. Feb. 6, 2015).
132 Id. at 42.
133 Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 294 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)).
134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
135 Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005).
136 Id.
137 THE FACTS ABOUT PUERTO RICO’S PUBLIC CORPORATIONS DEBT
ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT, supra note 14.
138 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) excludes both Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia
from utilizing Ch. 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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of the Bankruptcy Code.139 This intention is clear from the
legislative history of the Code. Prior to 1984, there was no
language banning Puerto Rico from utilizing Chapter 9.140 After
the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, the ban was
added, meaning that during the deliberations, it was purposefully
added to the Code.141 Whether or not the ban was added during
the course of negotiations and forgotten or was the result of a
scrivener’s error, the wording of the statute is precise.142 Thus,
this issue should not be resolved by Puerto Rico; it should be left
for Congress to decide and clarify the exact meaning of Puerto
Rico’s exclusion from Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.
There are several reasons why Congress could have
intended to exclude the Commonwealth from Chapter 9, including
the special protections afforded to Puerto Rican municipal bonds.143
Puerto Rican bonds are “Triple Tax Exempt,” and “[u]nder current
acts of the U.S. Congress, the interest on most bonds issue[d] by
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, its political subdivisions and
public corporations, is not includable in gross income for federal
income tax purposes or subject to income tax by state and local
municipalities.”144 The Puerto Rican tax exemptions are a huge
draw to investors and are part of the reason why so many
American investors own Puerto Rican municipal bonds.145
“Congress chose to give Puerto Rican bonds a nationwide tax
exemption, enjoyed by no state, and Congress chose to exclude
Puerto Rico from Chapter 9 . . . [t]he benefit and the restriction go
together.”146 The wording of the Bankruptcy Code, together with
the circumstantial evidence of Congressional intent, is sufficient
to establish that Congress explicitly meant to bar Puerto Rico
from municipal bankruptcy, and as such, the court in Franklin
correctly found that the Recovery Act is expressly preempted.
139 11 U.S.C. § 101(52).
140 In the prior iteration of the Bankruptcy Code, there was no definition of
“State” as it appears in the current version which now bans Puerto Rico from filing
municipal bankruptcies. Pub. L. No. 95, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
141 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, § 421(j), 98 Stat. 333, 369 (1984).
142 Cf. Hearing on H.R. 870, supra note 54, at 2-3 (testimony of John Pottow,
Univ. of Mich. Professor of Law).
143 Investor Resources, Introduction, COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, GOV’T DEV.
BANK FOR PUERTO RICO, http://www.gdb-pur.com/investors_resources/introduction.html (last
visited April 9, 2015).
144 Id.
145 Kuriloff, supra note 12.
146 Hearing on H.R. 870, supra note 54, at 6 (testimony of Thomas Mayer,
Partner, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP).
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In Franklin, the court did not reach the question of whether
the Recovery Act was barred by either field or conflict preemption,
as it had already deemed the Recovery Act unconstitutional under
express preemption.147 “Field preemption occurs when the federal
regulatory scheme is so ‘pervasive’ that it would be a reasonable
inference that ‘Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it.’”148 Given the long-held concern about state sovereignty and the
prevalence of Congressional legislation in the area of municipal
bankruptcy, it would be reasonable to assume that even if express
preemption were not found, the Recovery Act would be field
preempted. Congress has a vested interest in maintaining a
stable bankruptcy system for the country, and allowing states to
unilaterally decide how they should be able to restructure their
debts by developing individual municipal bankruptcy systems
state-by-state runs against this interest. Additionally, Congress
specifically limited Puerto Rico’s ability to pursue a municipal
bankruptcy, which the Recovery Act presumes to grant to the
Commonwealth. This would put the two laws into conflict,
establishing conflict preemption. Thus, although the Franklin
court may not have reached an analysis of these two types of
preemption, it would be safe to assume that the Recovery Act
would be preempted under either of these premises as well.
Puerto Rico also tries to rely upon section 903 of the
Bankruptcy Code to overcome the preemption bar.149 Section 903
states, “[t]his chapter . . . does not limit or impair the power of a
State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in
such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers
of such municipality, including expenditures for such exercise.”150
Chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code “both reserves to the state the
power to control a municipality in the exercise of its political and
governmental powers . . . and prohibits the court from interfering
with the property, revenues, and political and governmental
powers of the debtor unless the debtor consents.”151 Puerto Rico
attempts to argue that it is unfair “to read the federal Bankruptcy
147 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, No. 14-1518 (FAB), slip op. at
1, 2 (D.P.R. Feb. 6, 2015).
148 Alan J. Feld, The Limits of Bankruptcy Code Preemption: Debt Discharge
and Voidable Preference Reconsidered in Light of Sherwood Partners, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1447, 1463 (2006).
149 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
150 Id.
151 Memorandum of Decision on Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order
Authorizing Rejection of Executory Employment Contract with Joseph P. Moran III, In
re City of Cent. Falls, R.I., 468 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2012) (No. 11-13105-FJB), 2011
WL 9933766 at *4.
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Code as both precluding Puerto Rico municipalities from
participating in Chapter 9 proceedings and preempting Puerto
Rico laws that govern debt restructuring for Puerto Rico
municipalities.”152 However, as discussed above, it is apparent
that Congress intended to bar Puerto Rico from Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Whether or not this may be unfair and
regardless of whether or not Puerto Rico needs a bankruptcy
outlet to solve its fiscal problems, it is not the Commonwealth’s
place to overturn Congressional law. “States may not pass or
enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act
or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations.”153 The court in
Franklin looked closely at the text and legislative history behind
11 U.S.C. § 903 before agreeing that Puerto Rico would find no
solace in that clause.154 Municipal bankruptcy is not a right, as
evidenced both by Congress’s manifest intent in excluding Puerto
Rico and the fact that not all states allow their municipalities to
utilize Chapter 9. Thus, although Puerto Rico may believe that
municipal bankruptcy is crucial for the Commonwealth’s survival,
Congress has preempted it from following that route.
B. The Recovery Act Creates an Unconstitutional
Impairment of Contracts
The next argument against the Recovery Act is that it
violates the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states
that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . [l]aw impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”155 The court in Franklin analyzed
this issue but did not go further than denying Puerto Rico’s
motion to dismiss while stating that the bondholders had a
plausible claim.156 Even if the Recovery Act were not preempted, if
PREPA went into bankruptcy and forced creditors to restructure
their debt, it would constitute an improper abrogation of the
Commonwealth’s bond contracts.
Courts have generally read the Contracts Clause
somewhat liberally in favor of the states, although it still
represents a high hurdle for the Recovery Act to overcome.157
Bankruptcy laws occupy a unique space:
152 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, slip op. at 1, 38-39.
153 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
154 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, slip op. at 1, 40-41.
155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
156 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, slip op. at 1, 65.
157 Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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[w]hile section 10 of Article I of the Constitution is directed to the
States alone, we think it nevertheless states the policy of the
founders of the Government on the question of impairing the
obligation of contracts and that any Act of the national legislature
that does impair the obligation of contracts is contrary to that policy
and not within the powers delegated to the National Government,
except in specific cases, such as bankruptcy.158
However, in the past, some have tried to extend this exception to
state insolvency laws. “From time to time . . . it has been stated
that a state insolvency act is limited by the Contract Clause of the
Constitution in authorizing composition of preexisting
debts . . . but it all depends on what is affected by such a
composition and what state power it brings into play.”159 When
looking at a Contracts Clause claim, courts look at (1) “whether
the state law has . . . operated as a substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship” and (2) whether it was “reasonable and
necessary to serve an important government purpose.”160 The
purpose of the Recovery Act is to allow Puerto Rican municipal
corporations to restructure their debts from the contractual terms
of the bonds, meeting the first prong. In regards to the second
prong, Puerto Rico sees the looming economic and humanitarian
consequences of a PREPA default as a compelling reason for the
passage of the Recovery Act. Even with a liberal reading of the
Contracts Clause in their favor, Puerto Rico’s justifications for the
passage of the Recovery Act ring hollow.
To try and avoid the preemption and Contracts Clause
barriers, Puerto Rico characterizes the Recovery Act not as a
bankruptcy act, but as an “orderly” debt enforcement act, which
actually improves the position of the bondholders.161 Puerto Rico
relies upon Faitoute Iron & Steel Co., where, facing a Contracts
Clause challenge, “the Court upheld emergency [state] legislation
restructuring municipal debt even though creditors were thereby
deprived of the right to enforcement of claims against the
municipality.”162 Relying upon this precedent would allow a court to
158 Johnson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 208, 211 (Ct. Cl. 1948). Bankruptcy
is exempted from this because it has long been recognized that bankruptcy is necessary
for a healthy economy, and that for it to be effective, the restructuring or dispersal of
debts may be necessary.
159 Faitoute Iron& Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502, 513 (1942).
160 United Auto., Aero., Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Int’l Union v.
Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2011).
161 The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority’s Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint at 19 n.3, Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, No. 14-
1518 (D.P.R. July 21, 2014) [hereinafter FranklinMotion to Dismiss].
162 Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the
Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 684-85 (1988).
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find that Puerto Rico justly used its police powers to fill the
purported legislative gap to resolve the emergency situation.
Puerto Rico relies on Faitoute to show that the legislative
“gap” which leaves PREPA unable to file for bankruptcy under
federal laws can be remedied through the use of the
Commonwealth’s police power to avoid a catastrophe.163 One of
the key findings by the court in Faitoute, which echoes the
present Puerto Rican situation, was the pressing necessity of
passing the law due to unexpected and dire financial conditions.164
Seeing the potentially catastrophic consequences that a PREPA
default could have, Puerto Rico sees the present situation as
justifying the passage of the Recovery Act.165
While Faitoute has not been outright rejected, its usefulness
as precedent has come under heavy scrutiny. “First, other than in
one limited instance, Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury
Park, courts have always interpreted the Contracts Clause of the
United States Constitution to prohibit the states from enacting
legislation providing for municipal bankruptcies.”166 Not only is
Faitoute unique in this regard, but courts have distinguished
Faitoute on its facts, severely limiting its precedential value.167
The court in Franklin agreed that Puerto Rico’s reliance on
Faitoute was misguided, drawing a distinction based on the very
narrow tailoring of the law at issue in Faitoute.168
As grim as Puerto Rico’s situation may be, the
consequences of a PREPA default are not sufficient to justify a
law allowing the unconstitutional impairment of contracts.
Even if the Recovery Act were not preempted, it should be
deemed unconstitutional based on Contracts Clause principles.
Restructuring the bondholders contracts against their will is an
unconstitutional use of the Commonwealth’s powers, and if
allowed, opens up a floodgate of potential misuse.
C. The Recovery Act Constitutes an Unconstitutional Taking
If PREPA filed for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act,
the restructuring of its debt would provide the utility with relief
but would constitute an unconstitutional taking from bondholders.
163 Franklin Motion to Dismiss, supra 161, at 19 n.4.
164 Faitoute Iron & Steel Co., 316 U.S. at 511.
165 See supra Part II.
166 In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013)
(internal citation omitted).
167 Id.
168 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, slip op. at 1, 55-56.
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In Franklin, the bondholders made two assertions about how the
Recovery Act facilitated an unconstitutional taking.169 First, they
argued that it annulled their contractual right to appoint a
receiver in the event of a default; the court found that this was a
plausible claim but did not analyze it.170 Second, the bondholders
alleged that the Recovery Act took away the lien that the bond
covenants gave them on PREPA revenues; however, the court
determined that this claim was not yet ripe.171 Aside from these
particular claims, the Recovery Act raises other issues
concerning unconstitutional takings.
While states have the power to confiscate property under
the Constitution, it is heavily curtailed by the Fifth Amendment.172
The Fifth Amendment states that “private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”173 Courts have
previously held that “the Takings Clause applies unreservedly to
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”174 Nevertheless, “[t]he Fifth
Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes
taking without just compensation.”175
The Recovery Act creates vast potential for unconstitutional
takings during the course of a bankruptcy.176 Section 129(d) of the
Recovery Act reads,
[n]otwithstanding any section of this Act conditioning the eligible
obligor’s or the petitioner’s use or transfer of its property on adequate
protection of an entity’s interest in the property, if and when the police
power justifies and authorizes the temporary or permanent use or
transfer of property without adequate protection, the Court may
approve such use or transfer without adequate protection.177
Normally once a bankruptcy petition is filed, “[a]dequate protection
in the form of either cash payments or a replacement lien must be
provided the creditor whose collateral is decreasing in value or is
being consumed during the stay.”178 The Supreme Court
conceptualized the idea of adequate protection based on the
protections found in the Takings Clause.179 Section 129(d) of the
169 Id. at 65.
170 Id. at 70.
171 Id. at 26.
172 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
173 Id.
174 Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing
Tenoco Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1017 n.9 (1st Cir. 1989)).
175 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 194 (1985).
176 The Recovery Act, supra note 81.
177 Id.
178 S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5790.
179 Id. at 49; seeWright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
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Recovery Act would allow PREPA to sidestep these restrictions
whenever they believed that the “police power justifies” such an
action.180 Even though the court did not reach a decision on this
issue, the vast potential for misuse that this section represents is
another reason to hold the Recovery Act unconstitutional.
D. The Recovery Act Creates an Improper Stay of Federal
Litigation
The Recovery Act’s automatic stay provision is an
improper attempt by the Commonwealth to limit federal
litigation. Similar to the Bankruptcy Code, the Recovery Act
contains a stay which prevents the commencement or
enforcement of certain actions against the debtor or the debtor’s
estate.181 If PREPA were to file for bankruptcy under the
Recovery Act, the stay would automatically stop any ongoing
litigation, and prevent the subsequent filing of any federal
proceedings. However, “state courts lack any power under the
Constitution to enjoin proceedings in federal court.”182 The Court
in Franklin declined to address this issue, as the claims were not
yet ripe. However, this provides yet another basis for finding the
Recovery Act unconstitutional.183
The automatic stay under the Recovery Act stays “the
commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, arbitrative, administrative,
or other action or proceeding against the petitioner” for “any act
to collect, assess, or recover on a claim against the petitioner
that arose before the filing of a petition under Chapter 3 of this
Act, including any act to obtain possession or control of property
belonging to the petitioner.”184 Even though the stay under the
Recovery Act may not last for the duration of the bankruptcy, it
would still impermissibly bar federal litigation, contrary to
federalism principles.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE RECOVERY ACT
While PREPA and Puerto Rico’s situation may seem grim,
there are alternatives to the constitutionally deficient Recovery
180 The Recovery Act, supra note 81.
181 Id.
182 Complaint at 13, Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of PR.,
No. 14-1518 (D.P.R. June 28, 2014); see also Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964)).
183 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, No. 14-1518 (FAB), slip op. at
1, 55-56 (D.P.R. Feb. 6, 2015).
184 The Recovery Act, supra note 81.
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Act. Many of these other options would avoid in whole, or in part,
the catastrophic impact that the Recovery Act would have on the
Commonwealth, its people, its investors, the global economic
market, and the legal community.
Even if the Recovery Act were to stand, under its own
provisions, it could have limited utility. Together, dissenting
bondholders hold a total of approximately $2.1 billion out of the
$8.6 billion in outstanding PREPA debt.185 Not only is this
proportion of opposing investors important for its dollar amount,
but also for the wrench it could throw into a possible PREPA
Recovery Act reorganization, by blocking the creditor agreement to
restructuring plans. In both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the
Recovery Act, approval by a certain percentage of a class of
investors is required, and together the dissenting bondholders hold
nearly 25% of PREPA’s debt, giving them the potential opportunity
to disrupt an attempted reorganization under the Recovery Act.
One of the core issues with the Recovery Act is that Puerto
Rico is trying to step in and legislate in an area reserved for the
federal government. There are no ways to save the Recovery Act
from its constitutional defects. The most feasible way to solve
PREPA’s problems is to find a solution that minimizes the
economic repercussions of turning around PREPA. There are
solutions that can accomplish this goal while avoiding the
Recovery Act’s constitutional pitfalls; for example, Puerto Rico
could introduce legislation to Congress to change the Federal
Bankruptcy Code or eschew a forced legislative restructuring
altogether. There are also financially focused alternatives PREPA
could pursue, including a private workout with creditors or trying
to turn around its business. The complexity of the situation and the
potential for severe global consequences prevents an easy solution,
but the following alternatives, or some combination of them, would
at least provide a better solution than the Recovery Act.
A. Introduce Legislation to Congress
Puerto Rico’s nonvoting congressional delegate in the U.S.
House of Representatives has already introduced legislation that
would allow Puerto Rico to take advantage of U.S. municipal
bankruptcy laws.186 Passage of this law would permit Puerto Rico
185 Hunter, supra note 126.
186 Michael Aneiro, House Bill Proposes Puerto Rico Bankruptcy; S&P
Downgrades PREPA Utility, BARRON’S (July 31, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com/
incomeinvesting/2014/07/31/house-bill-proposes-puerto-rico-b.
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to file for municipal bankruptcy while avoiding the constitutional
issues that the Recovery Act faces. However, this would not
address PREPA’s underlying structural problems or many of the
economic issues of the situation.
The proposed legislation simply reads, “[t]o amend title 11
of the United States Code to treat Puerto Rico as a State for
purposes of Chapter 9 of such title relating to the adjustment of
debts of municipalities.”187 This bill provides a better option than
the Recovery Act because it attempts to achieve the same goal as
the Recovery Act within the structure of the American legislative
system. Many of the constitutional problems of the Recovery Act
arose because it was an attempt to sidestep the involvement of
the federal government. While this may seem like an attractive
option, there is no real timetable for when the law could be
passed. Since its introduction on July 31, 2014, there has been
little progress on the bill; it was “[r]eferred to the Subcommittee
on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law” on
September 26, 2014.188 The hearing was finally held on February
26, 2015.189 At the hearing, arguments were presented on all sides
of the issue. Proponents for the bondholders claimed that it would
be unfair to uphold a law that seriously undermines the position
of bondholders who negotiated the bond covenants under the
assumption that a Puerto Rican municipal bankruptcy was
impossible.190 Conversely, a representative from the GDB
expressed the belief that their Franklin appeal would be successful
and that the Recovery Act was the best solution for PREPA’s
problems.191 Proponents of the bill emphasize that Puerto Rico
should be granted the autonomy to make its own decision
concerning municipal bankruptcies as other states do, to take it
out of the current “infantilizing no man’s land it finds itself in
under current bankruptcy law.”192 The new law has been backed
by both the National Bankruptcy Conference as well as the
Commonwealth’s Governing Party.193
186 Andrew Bary, Puerto Rico Downgrade Raises Default Fears, BARRON’S
(July 1, 2014), http://online.barrons.com/news/articles/SB5000142405311190424890458
0003610191234810.
187 Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act of 2014, H.R.5305, 113th Cong. (2014).
188 Id.
189 Hearing on H.R. 870, supra note 54.
190 Id. at 6 (testimony of Thomas Mayer).
191 Id. at 7 (testimony of Melba Acosta-Febo).
192 Id. at 2 (testimony of John Pottow, Univ. of Mich. Professor of Law).
193 Andrew Scurria, House Bill Would Open Up Ch. 9 to Puerto Rico Public
Cos., LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/563298/house-
bill-would-open-up-ch-9-to-puerto-rico-public-cos.
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There are arguments, however, to be made against this
course of action. The bondholders who invested billions in PREPA
and its tax-free bonds relied on the fact that the utility could not
enter municipal bankruptcy; to retroactively apply this law would
be unfair to them.194 Additionally, both PREPA and Puerto Rico
will need to be able to continue to raise money to remain solvent
in the near future.195 Investor confidence in Puerto Rican bonds is
already at a low point, and passage of this law could further drive
away the investors that the Commonwealth and its public
utilities will need for future bond offerings.196 Currently, PREPA
is only able to continue operating because creditors have extended
the utility’s short-term loans, but there is no guarantee that they
will continue to do so.197
While this option is attractive because it avoids
constitutional issues, there is no set timeframe for when this
option could have an effect on PREPA’s situation. Representative
Pierluisi, the Puerto Rican Congressman who introduced the bill,
is handcuffed by the fact that he cannot vote on the bill due to his
status as non-voting delegate. Even if passed, the bill could drive
away the investors that the island needs to avoid an economic
collapse and would not avoid the economic issues associated
with such a large-scale municipal bankruptcy. This option
should still be pursued, if only to serve as a last resort to provide
an orderly restructuring if PREPA is forced to choose between
bankruptcy or default.
B. PREPA Default or U.S. Government Bailout
If it came down to it, PREPA could follow the path chosen
by Argentina and default on its debts, taking the utility out of the
Recovery Act. Investors on edge since Detroit’s municipal
bankruptcy have feared a Puerto Rican debt default and its
potential consequences.198 PREPA has previously come perilously
194 Hearing on H.R. 870, supra note 54, at 4 (testimony of John Pottow, Univ.
of Mich. Professor of Law).
195 See supra Part II.
196 Hearing on H.R. 870, supra note 54, at 4 (testimony of Thomas Mayer,
Partner, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP).
197 Brian Chappatta, Puerto Rico’s Power Agency Wins Bank Loan Extension
to March, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
08-14/puerto-rico-electric-authority-gets-bank-loans-extended-to-march.html.
198 Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis: Neither a State nor Independent, supra note 22.
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close to a default, which it only avoided through a last minute
credit extension.199
Puerto Rico’s economy is already struggling, and if PREPA
defaulted, it could tip the Commonwealth’s economy towards its
own default. “The ability of the commonwealth or any of its
authorities to issue debt has diminished substantially . . . and the
restructuring law is one of the key reasons.”200 If the mere threat
of a municipal restructuring had such an effect on the
Commonwealth’s finances, it is hard to imagine how drastic of an
effect a full-blown default could have. A default by the island itself
would pose a greater threat to the world’s economy than the
effects of just a PREPA default.201
Some have speculated that if PREPA were forced to
default, the United States Government would intervene with a
bailout to prevent economic ripple effects.202 In January 2014,
when investors started taking notice of the island’s distress, it
was reported that “[t]he White House [was] not considering a
financial bailout for Puerto Rico, where chronic fiscal challenges
have raised the specter of a Detroit-like bankruptcy.”203 The federal
government has also shown its willingness to allow municipal
bankruptcies to proceed when it declined to provide a bailout to
Detroit in its own record-breaking municipal bankruptcy.204 While
a PREPA default may become an unavoidable fact at some point, it
is not an option that should be willingly pursued. Indeed, it would
be a grave mistake for the Commonwealth to default based on the
assumption that the U.S. government would provide a bailout.
199 Puerto Rico’s PREPA Gets Extension From Creditors, REUTERS (July 31,
2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/31/usa-puertorico-prepa-idUS
L2N0Q628120140731.
200 CB Online Staff, Moody’s Details Dim View of Recovery Act, CARIBBEAN BUS.
(July 24, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.caribbeanbusinesspr.com/news/moodys-details-dim-
view-of-recovery-act-98946.html.
201 See supra Part II.
202 Charles Tatelbaum, Puerto Rico May Be the Next Big Bailout For U.S.
Taxpayers, REAL CLEAR MKTS. (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/
articles/2014/04/10/puerto_rico_may_be_the_next_big_bailout_for_us_taxpayers__10
0998.html.
203 Mark Felsenthal, White House Not Considering Puerto Rico Bailout,
Official Says, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2014, 4:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/01/22/us-usa-puertorico-finances-idUSBREA0L23V20140122.
204 Jackie Calmes, $300 Million in Detroit Aid, But No Bailout, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/us/300-million-in-detroit-aid-but-
no-bailout.html?pagewanted%3Dall&_r=0.
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C. PREPA Private Workout with Creditors
PREPA could also attempt to consensually restructure
some of its debt with creditors through a private workout. This
would give PREPA some breathing room to hopefully effectuate
an internal restructuring of its processes. To some extent,
PREPA has already completed a small workout. In July 2014,
some of the holders of PREPA’s lines of credit agreed to extend
payment deadlines to ease the pressure on the utility, which, at
the time, was about to default.205 In response, the executive
director of PREPA stated, “[t]his latest show of support from our
bondholders, bond insurers and lenders provides us with
additional time to evaluate all available options to ensure we are
reaching the best possible outcome for our employees, customers,
creditors and suppliers,” indicating a willingness to make
changes to become profitable again.206
While this was certainly a beneficial step for PREPA to
take in the short-term, it does not address the many long-term
issues that PREPA faces. PREPA has deep-seated operating and
economic issues that need to be addressed for the utility to escape
the financial morass that led to the passage of the Recovery Act.207
Nonetheless, PREPA has not invested in more efficient production
systems because the costs are prohibitive, and they need to borrow
money to merely continue producing electricity.208
Outside of a forced debt restructuring in the bankruptcy
context, it seems unlikely that PREPA would be able to convince
investors to willingly take a reduction in their expected returns.
The Argentine situation illustrates this difficulty: the country
tried to commence negotiations with bondholders, and after being
unable to reach an agreement, decided to unilaterally default on
its debt, damaging the country’s economic relationships and
global reputation.209
However, while a workout may be difficult, there are
incentives that PREPA could provide to bondholders to convince
them to engage in meaningful negotiations. If Congress passes
Representative Pierluisi’s law, the specter of a constitutionally
205 Puerto Rico’s PREPA Gets Extension From Creditors, supra note 199.
206 Id.
207 Richard Chesley, The Examiners: PREPA Restructuring Requires Time,
Liquidity, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2014, 12:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/
2014/10/07/the-examiners-prepa-restructuring-requires-time-liquidity/.
208 Id.
209 Taos Turner, Argentina Warns U.S. Relations Could Worsen Over Appointee’s
Affiliations, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/argentina-
warns-u-s-relations-could-worsen-over-appointees-affiliations-1415042456.
1706 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4
sanctioned restructuring could make investors more pliable.
Additionally, PREPA could attempt to build off of its earlier
extension and show investors that it has a feasible plan to become
profitable in the future. Any of these talks would be hampered by
the current investor distrust of PREPA and Puerto Rico, which
could be remedied by repealing the Recovery Act. A workout with
creditors would avoid the Recovery Act’s constitutional issues and
allow PREPA a short term respite but would fail to address the
changes needed to pull PREPA out of its economic tailspin.
D. Turn Around the Business
The most optimistic solution is for PREPA to change its
operating processes and become profitable again, enabling it to
pay its debts and avoiding the Recovery Act altogether. This
would not be an easy task to accomplish, as the utility is facing a
host of economic and operating issues. Nevertheless, there are
some short-term changes that PREPA could make that would
allow it to then make the more costly changes to ensure
profitability for the long term.
PREPA has several factors working in its favor to begin this
process. “The Authority’s Current Forecast for fiscal years 2014
through 2018 predicts a 1.3% growth in total energy sales for fiscal
year 2014, with an average annual growth rate of 1.2% in fiscal
years 2014 through 2018.”210 Compared to a 1.1% growth forecast
in the mainland U.S., PREPA has a rapidly growing customer
market.211 Additionally, the price of crude oil has been dropping,
recently hitting a three-year low, which will help PREPA lower its
operating costs.212 In fact, based on these factors, “[t]he Consulting
Engineers believe[] the Authority will receive sufficient revenues
in fiscal year 2014 with the existing rates to cover current
expenses . . . and to exceed its 120% debt service coverage
requirement.”213 If this forecast proves true, PREPA could look away
from short-term debt obligations and begin planning for the future.
For PREPA to stay viable for the long term, it would need
to adopt more efficient means of generating energy and raise its
rates to customers. “PREPA has not raised its ‘base rate’—the
210 URS, FORTIETH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ELECTRIC PROPERTY OF THE




212 U.S. Crude Settles Above $77 After Hitting 3-Year Low, CNBC (Nov. 4,
2014, 2:54 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102148210#.
213 URS, supra note 210.
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rate that pays for everything other than fuel and purchased
power—in nearly 26 years,” something that mainland public
utilities regularly do to cover costs.214 Even a modest increase,
accompanied by renewed efforts to collect delinquent accounts,
could be a boon to the utility. In 2012, Fitch determined that, for
PREPA to become an efficient and sustainable entity, it needed to
reduce its reliance on gas-powered power plants.215 PREPA could
use the savings from the dropping price of gas as a catalyst to
begin this transition. According to a 2012 report, PREPA’s “value
could be increased by as much as $1.2 billion through a full
implementation of performance improvements that would bring
one-time savings as well as ongoing operating cost reductions.”216
This option is attractive because it would avoid the
economic ripple effects of a large municipal bankruptcy, as well as
the costly and potentially embarrassing litigation that would
accompany it. A PREPA turnaround could energize Puerto Rico
as a whole and lead to renewed economic self-sufficiency for the
island. As attractive as this option may sound, it is not a feasible
option on its own. The cost cutting changes that PREPA would
need to implement are currently a source of contention in the
Puerto Rican Senate, and some top officials have been unable to
agree on a restructuring plan.217 Additionally, PREPA would likely
be unable to borrow the vast sums of money it would need to make
infrastructure upgrades. If it could be implemented, a business
practice overhaul would be the best option for all involved, but
standing alone it is insufficient to solve PREPA’s issues.
E. A Combination of Solutions and PREPA’s Future Prospects
The most feasible solution to PREPA’s short- and long-
term problems will require a combination of the aforementioned
solutions. Any plan will have to be done without the Recovery Act,
as there is no way to remedy the statute’s constitutional defects.
The best solution will involve stop-gap measures to allow PREPA
to continue operation, while at the same time preparing
214 Hearing on H.R. 870, supra note 54, at 4 (testimony of Thomas Mayer,
Partner, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP).
215 FITCH RATINGS, supra note 10.
216 John Marino, PREPA Profits on Rising Oil Prices; Faces Financial
Obstacles to Decreasing Oil Dependence, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Apr. 23, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.caribbeanbusinesspr.com/prnt_ed/prepa-profits-on-rising-oil-prices-faces-
financial-obstacles-to-decreasing-oil-dependence-9805.html.
217 CB Online Staff, Bhatia Ramps Up Push for Energy Reform, CARIBBEAN
BUS. (Mar. 26, 2014, 7:05 AM), http://www.caribbeanbusiness.pr/news/bhatia-ramps-
up-push-for-energy-reform-95237.html.
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contingency plans if these methods fail, and having long term
goals to become profitable.
The first goal will be to gain some financial breathing room
in the short term. PREPA needs to continue to draw loans to
operate, but also needs capital to upgrade its power plants. PREPA
could begin by attempting to build off of the small workout they
recently realized with creditors and obtain either a further
extension on the debt, or agree to pay the debt back at a lower rate
over a longer period of time.218 To convince creditors to deal with
them, PREPA will likely need to make operating changes to assure
creditors that they are on track towards profitability. This would
require PREPA to raise its rates, in turn requiring the Puerto
Rican Senate to agree on some middle ground regarding this
issue.219 While this may be an unpopular move in the short term, a
modest rate increase could greatly benefit PREPA and Puerto
Rican citizens in the long term. Additionally, PREPA would need to
overhaul its collections systems, as the utility has outstanding
accounts receivable of approximately $1.8 billion.220 Even collecting
a small portion of this amount would increase confidence that
PREPA will become profitable, while simultaneously increasing the
capital that PREPA has to work with. Unfortunately, during this
collections process PREPAmay need to cut off service to delinquent
customers. If this were done systematically and on a small and
managed scale, and not as a result of a mass default and shutoff,
the impact of the shutoffs could be minimized and the public
outcry that Detroit faced could be avoided.221
For PREPA to be able to make the necessary structural
changes to its operations, it will need capital to do so.222 While
raising rates and collecting accounts receivable are a good start,
PREPA would eventually need to raise money on the open market
to be able to afford the necessary upgrades. To do so, PREPA
would need to regain investor confidence in the utility’s ability to
pay back its debts. To begin this process, PREPA could show a
reaffirmation of its intent to stand by its debts to bondholders by
218 See Christian Thompson, Guess What’s Going on in Puerto Rico; You Have
To: Opening Line, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Sept. 17, 2014, 5:58 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-17/guess-what-s-going-on-in-puerto-
rico-you-have-to-opening-line.
219 CB Online Staff, supra note 217.
220 Edward Krudy, Megan Davies & Lisa Lambert, Update 4-Puerto Rico’s
PREPA Urged to Get Tough on $1.8 Bln Owed, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2014, 3:46 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/17/usa-puertorico-idUSL2N0T71CQ20141117.
221 See Lopez, supra note 115.
222 Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Facing Debt Risk Beyond Power Utility: Muni
Credit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2015, 8:00 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-
14/puerto-rico-facing-debt-risk-beyond-power-utility-muni-credit.html.
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urging the Commonwealth to repeal the Recovery Act or vowing
not utilize the Recovery Act. This would allow PREPA to more
easily raise money to begin making some of the structural changes
necessary to reduce its reliance on oil and move toward more
sustainable methods of production. Hopefully, with a combination
of increased income and capital raised from investors, PREPA
could retrofit its power plants, enabling the utility to become
economically self-sustaining.
In preparing for the future, Puerto Rico should continue to
push for Congress to pass legislation allowing Puerto Rican
municipalities to utilize Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.223
This should not be done with the intention of using bankruptcy as
an end goal, but as a safety valve in case PREPA cannot be
brought back on track. Although municipal bankruptcies have far
reaching effects and everything possible should be done to avoid
them, ultimately, a default would be worse.
Following these recommendations would solve a number of
the problems outlined in this note. First, by repealing the Recovery
Act, the aforementioned constitutional issues would be avoided.
This would also help PREPA and Puerto Rico raise their credit
rating and increase investor confidence, potentially reversing the
path towards a Greek-like financial crisis. Once the changes have
been made to make PREPA a more efficient entity, the focus
should become preserving this status. Puerto Rico Senate
President Batia has stated, “[a] state monopoly that regulates itself
is a natural conflict of interest . . . [PREPA] decides the fate of its
competitors,” which could very well be one of the contributing
factors to PREPA’s current slide towards insolvency.224
This conflict of interest could be resolved by privatizing
PREPA. However, this is not a solution that would be in the best
interests of the Commonwealth and ultimately may not be
possible. “A full privatization of the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (Prepa) would only be feasible with an increase in
electricity rates or a restructuring of its debt, according to a
2012 report by Alvarez & Marsal (A&M) for the Government
Development Bank (GDB).”225 The key reason for this difficulty
is that the report “valued . . . [PREPA] at about half the amount
223 Scurria, supra note 16.
224 John Marino, Prepa Privatization Talk Grows With Concerns Over Power
Costs, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://caribbeanbusinesspr.com/
prnt_ed/prepa-privatization-talk-grows-with-concerns-over-power-costs-8947.html.
225 John Marino, 2012 Report Details Prepa Privatization Options, CARIBBEAN
BUS. (Sept. 15, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.caribbeanbusinesspr.com/prnt_ed/2012-
report-details-prepa-privatization-options-10412.html.
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of its long-term debt.”226 Privatization would also carry a host of
downsides for the utility. If privatized, PREPA would lose the
cheaper financing that it receives as a municipal corporation.227
Additionally, privatization would likely lead to massive rate
hikes for Puerto Ricans who are already dealing with a
struggling economy.228 Beyond this, privatization could also lead
to job cuts, further harming Puerto Rico’s struggling economy.229
The better solution to this problem is currently being
debated in the Puerto Rican Senate, where Representative
Rodriguez has proposed the formation of an Energy Regulatory
Commission to create an independent regulator for the Puerto
Rican energy market.230 “The board would not only be charged
with setting prices, but could also order cuts in operational
expenses, resolve disputes between parties and take other
significant actions.”231 The creation of this Commission would be a
boon to PREPA and Puerto Rico as a whole. PREPA’s consecutive
years of losses and its decision not to keep up with technological
advances in power generation implies that a form of oversight
would be a beneficial change for the utility. By taking the power
to make some of these decisions out of PREPA’s hands, the
Commonwealth can eliminate PREPA’s conflict between doing
what is best for the utility and what is in the best interests of the
public that it serves. Ultimately, this will be PREPA’s best option
to continue as a viable entity. Between making the financial
changes outlined above and repealing the Recovery Act, PREPA
can hopefully begin to become profitable and serve as a catalyst to
rejuvenating the Puerto Rican economy as a whole.
CONCLUSION
While there may be no clear or immediately apparent
means of saving PREPA, the Recovery Act was not the correct
response to the situation. Its passage runs afoul of the
Constitution and deep-seated notions of federalism, raising more
problems than it solves. The Recovery Act is burdened by
constitutional concerns that outweigh its proposed utility. Aside
from this, allowing PREPA to either default on its debt or to
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create a global economic crisis that could be avoided. Although
several potential solutions to PREPA’s situation were provided,
ultimately the utility’s fate may depend on factors beyond its
control, including the economy of Puerto Rico as a whole. Lastly,
although none of the provided alternatives are perfect, they at
least provide some semblance of hope that PREPA can remain
viable while avoiding the constitutional morass in which the
Recovery Act is mired.
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